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Is U.S. Agricultural Productivity Growth Slowing?  
1. Introduction 
The notion that U.S. agricultural productivity growth is slowing is implicit in the recent policy 
debate. Alston and Pardey (2009) link the decline in real food prices over the last 50 years to 
growth in agricultural productivity, but they question if the pattern of growth over the next 50 
years will mirror that of the last 50 years. They answer this question in James et al. (2009) by 
describing a significant slowdown in productivity growth after 1990, a phenomenon “…that is 
not a temporary cyclical event but more structural and sustained.” Slower productivity growth, 
they argue, will lead to an erosion in international competitiveness and to a widening gap 
between global supply and demand for agricultural products. The implications for food security, 
especially among the world’s poor, are decidedly negative.  
The above assessment reveals considerable pessimism regarding the prospects for 
continued strong productivity growth. But other authors project a less pessimistic tone. Ball et al. 
(2010) addressed the international competitiveness of agriculture in the European Union (EU) 
and the United States. They found that the United States maintained a competitive advantage 
throughout the period 1973-2002, except for the years 1983 to 1985. Further, they attributed 
United States competitiveness to relatively rapid productivity growth.1  
More recently, Wang, Schimmelpfennig, and Fuglie (2012) looked at productivity growth 
rates for the twelve countries included in the Ball et al. (2010) study to determine if any of these 
countries experienced a significant slowing in the rate of growth. France and Sweden exhibited a 
statistically significant slowdown. Fuglie (2008) used FAO data to assess globally the slowdown 
                                                          
1
 They provide a formal definition of the concept of competitiveness and relate it to the more conventional concept 
of relative productivity growth. 
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hypothesis. He found no evidence of a systematic slowdown in the rate of sector-wide 
productivity growth.    
In this paper, we revisit the slowdown hypothesis. We believe there are a number of 
issues that were not adequately addressed in previous studies. First, productivity growth has 
often been measured by a single factor, such as output per acre. Alston, Beddow, and Pardey 
(2009) point to declining crop yields as the proximate cause of recent food price increases. But 
growth in land productivity depends on changes in the levels of other inputs (e.g., fertilizers) per 
acres, as well as the pace of technical innovations. Total factor productivity (TFP), on the other 
hand, measures the contribution to output of innovation alone and is a more meaningful indicator 
of sustainability. Second, arbitrary or convenient sub-periods have often been chosen when 
investigating the slowdown hypothesis, but the timing of transitory shocks and the occurrence of 
statistically significant structural breaks might fall in more irregular time periods. Those 
exogenous shocks that have briefly but forcefully influenced productivity growth must be 
identified if unmeasured factors influencing changes in productivity are to be considered, as 
Thirtle, Holding and Jenkins (2004) argue they should. And third, even though the time series 
properties of the productivity data might influence the characterization of a possible slowdown, 
this avenue of investigation has not been pursued. Phillips (1986; 1998; 2010) steadfastly argues 
that those time series tests that make rigorous conclusions possible must be part of the 
investigation. 
Our investigation of the slowdown hypothesis focuses on statistics on agricultural 
productivity published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The USDA has long 
been concerned with sectoral productivity growth. In fact, the USDA in 1960 was the first 
agency to introduce a multifactor productivity measure into the Federal statistical program. 
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Today, the Department’s Economic Research Service (ERS) bases its official productivity 
statistics on a sophisticated system of production accounts. The model of productivity growth is 
based on the translog transformation frontier. It relates the growth rates of multiple outputs to the 
cost-share weighted growth rates of labor, capital, and intermediate goods.2  
The applied USDA model is quite detailed. The changing demographic character of the 
agricultural labor force is used to construct a quality-adjusted index of labor input.3 Similarly, 
much asset specific detail underlies the measure of capital input. Construction of the measure of 
capital input begins with estimating the capital stock for each component of capital input. For 
depreciable assets, the capital stocks are the cumulation of past investments adjusted for discards 
of worn-out assets and loss of efficiency of assets over their service life.4 The capital stocks of 
land and inventories are measured as implicit quantities derived from balance sheet data. The 
index of capital input is formed by aggregating over the various capital assets using cost-share 
weights based on asset-specific rental prices. As is the case for labor input, the resulting measure 
of capital input is adjusted for changes in asset quality. The contributions of feed and seed, 
energy, and agricultural chemicals to output growth are captured in the index of intermediate 
inputs. An important innovation is the use of hedonic price indexes in constructing measures of 
fertilizers and pesticides consumption. The result is a time series of productivity indexes 
spanning the years 1948 to 2009. 
2. Patterns of Productivity Growth 
Before addressing formally the hypothesis of slower productivity growth, we provide an 
overview of the patterns of growth over the postwar period. Table 1 reports average annual rates 
                                                          
2
 A complete description of the USDA model can be found in Ball et al. (1999). 
3
 See Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) for a discussion of input quality. 
4
  See Ball et al. (2008) for further discussion. 
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of productivity growth for the full 1948-2009 period and for twelve peak-to-peak sub-periods.5 
Over the 1948-2009 period, productivity growth averaged 1.52% per year. Growth in 
productivity was negative in only one sub-period (1948-53), and fell below 1% only then and in 
three other sub-periods. The average rate of growth in productivity exceeded 2% per year in six 
of twelve sub-periods. 
The USDA measure of output is equated with gross production. As a result, inputs of 
intermediate goods, obviously crucial to agricultural production, are treated symmetrically with 
labor and capital inputs. From table 1, we see that growth in intermediate inputs averaged 1.43% 
per year over the 1948-2009 period. Energy use increased less than 1% per year, but the growth 
rate in chemicals input exceeded 2.5% annually. Inputs of farm origin increased an average of 
1.15% per year.   
Labor input in agriculture contracted at an average annual rate of 2.51% over the postwar 
period. Moreover, this pattern persisted through all twelve sub-periods.  
Capital input increased dramatically in the immediate postwar period. Service flows from 
durable equipment increased at an 11.1% average annual rate over the 1948-53 period, reflecting 
rapid mechanization of agriculture. But the average rate of growth over the full 1948-2009 
period was less than 1% per year. Other capital inputs, including non-residential structures and 
inventories, exhibited similar patterns. Land input, however, declined at a 0.52% average annual 
rate. Overall, capital input declined 0.21% per year. 
In spite of the declines in capital and labor inputs and the relatively modest increase in 
intermediate inputs, growth in farm sector output averaged 1.63% per year over the 1948-2009 
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  Annual data are available electronically at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/agproductivity/  
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period. These results leave little doubt that productivity growth was the principal factor 
responsible for economic growth in postwar agriculture. In the late 1970s, however, the capacity 
of the sector to sustain historical rates of productivity growth came into question. In 1972, the 
subsidized retirement of land totaled 60 million acres. This figure was less than 20 million acres 
in 1973 and declined to zero in 1974. In the aftermath of a rapid expansion in land use and total 
agricultural output, such indicators as crop output per acre of land lent some credence to the 
hypothesis of slower productivity growth and pending economic scarcity. 
Between 1973 and 1979, the average annual rate of growth in output was 2.26%. But 
nearly three-fourths of the growth in output over this period was accounted for by growth in 
inputs. In contrast, input growth accounted for only 0.46 percentage points of the 2.65% annual 
growth rate achieved during the 1969-1973 period. The contraction in labor input continued 
during the 1973-79 period, but at a much slower pace than during the previous six sub-periods. 
The rate of growth in capital input over the 1973-79 period was second only to that of the 1948-
53 period. Service flows from durable equipment increased more than 3.5% per year. Despite a 
threefold increase in the price of petroleum fuels following the 1973 oil embargo, the rate of 
growth in energy consumption exceeded 4% per year. Consumption of agricultural chemicals 
increased at a 3.29% annual rate. The 0.62% average annual rate of growth in total factor 
productivity was less than one-third the growth rate over the 1969-73 period and was well below 
trend.       
The ‘specter of scarcity’ of the 1970s gave way to expectations of chronic economic 
surpluses in the 1980s. In 1982, the land area set aside totaled some 10 million acres. This total 
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exceeded 80 million acres in 1983.6 Output growth slowed to just over 1.5% per year in the 
1979-81 sub-period and less than 1% per year over the succeeding 1981-90 sub-period. But total 
input growth was negative in both periods. Growth in total factor productivity rebounded. In fact, 
the 3.39% rate of growth in productivity during the 1979-81 sub-period was second only to the 
3.53% average annual rate of growth over the period 1957 to 1960.     
The early 2000s saw renewed concerns about a possible slowing of productivity growth. 
The average annual rate of growth in productivity was less than 1% per year over the 2000-07 
period. In this way, the situation was similar to that in the 1970s. During the period 1973-79, 
growth in output did not deviate much from trend. Durable equipment, energy, and chemicals 
inputs, however, exhibited significant positive growth at rates far in excess of the incremental 
growth in output, accounting for the measured decline in productivity growth.  
During the 2000-07 sub-period, we saw the emergence of bio-fuels as a major source of 
demand for grains and oilseeds. Corn used in ethanol production in 2007 accounted for roughly 
one-fourth of total demand. In response, producers abandoned usual crop rotations, opting 
instead for continuous planting of corn. The land area planted to corn increased some 15 million 
acres in 2007. Despite increased consumption of fertilizers and pesticides, yields per acre were 
essentially unchanged.  
Overall, the gains in agricultural productivity have been quite impressive. However, it 
remains to be determined if slower productivity growth during the 1970s and more recently 
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  In January of 1983, the Reagan administration implemented a program that was to make sharp cuts in production 
and reduce Government stocks at the same time by paying farmers not to produce, with payment to be made in the 
form of commodities from Government stocks. As was the case in earlier legislation, farmers had to idle land to be 
in the price support program. A total of 82 million acres were pledged for diversion to conserving uses under the 
payment-in-kind (PIK) and related acreage reduction programs, the largest amount of land ever taken out of 
production in the United States. This meant that over a third of the land normally planted to wheat, rice, upland 
cotton, and corn and sorghum grain was idled.  
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represent a shift in the long term path of productivity growth. This is the focus of the following 
section. 
3. The Slowdown Hypothesis 
Tests for a productivity slowdown typically involve partitioning the sample into two sub-periods 
and comparing the resulting mean rates of growth. A more formal approach, attributed to Chow 
(1960) involves estimating regression parameters for each sub-period and testing the equality of 
the two sets of parameters using an F-test. An important limitation of both approaches is that the 
breakdate must be known a priori. The researcher must either pick an arbitrary candidate 
breakdate or pick a breakdate based on some known feature of the data. As Hansen (2001) points 
out, the test results can be ‘uninformative’ because they can miss the true breakdate, or can be 
‘misleading’ because the breakdate is endogenous and the test can indicate a break when none in 
fact exists. Therefore, we propose to test for a productivity slowdown using techniques that allow 
for unknown structural breaks jointly with a possible unit root that can have either or both 
stochastic and deterministic components.7  
Analytical Framework 
To address the slowdown hypothesis, we posit a simple trend model 
(1)   ln  =  + 
 +	 ,	 
                                                          
7
 Time series filters such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter that separate a time series into trend and cyclical components 
are not useful here. Their assumption of a stationary cyclical component driven by stochastic cycles assumes away 
much of the variability that we wish to analyze.   
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and test the null hypothesis of a stable linear model against the alternative of ‘breaks’ in the 
parameters in the trend regression. The simple comparative static of (1) with respect to time  
yields 
 ln 
	
= 	 
 
where 
 is the trend rate of productivity growth over time.  
Structural Breaks 
To determine if there are structural breaks, we first conduct the Elliott and Müller (2006) ‘quasi-
Local Level’ (qLL) test. The qLL test allows for a large class of breaking trends including many 
or relatively few breaks, breaks that occur close to one another, breaks that occur at regular 
intervals, and smooth transitions in 
 that statistically indicate a break in trend. This allows us to 
determine if the time series has been free of structural breaks over the study period. The qLL test 
accomplishes this by assessing the general persistence of the time variation in the regression 
coefficients in (1). The first row of table 2 reports the qLL test results. We can reject the null 
hypothesis of fixed coefficients, both intercept and trend, at the usual confidence level. However, 
this qLL test does not provide information on the timing of the structural breaks. Additional 
break tests are required to determine the number of breaks and their form over time.  
Unit Root Tests without Structural Breaks  
Our next objective is to determine if there is also a stochastic component to the time series and if 
this result is sensitive to the structural breaks just identified. As Perron (1989) shows, standard 
unit root tests that ignore possible structural breaks will be biased in favor of failing to reject the 
null of a unit root. Accordingly, we conduct unit root tests with and without structural breaks. 
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We conduct three fundamentally different unit root tests without structural breaks. The 
augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) unit root test and the autocorrelation robust Phillips 
and Perron (1988) test are the most widely used tests for stationarity, but these tests have low 
power, increasing the likelihood of type II errors (Schmidt and Phillips, 1992). It is possible that 
these first two unit root tests could fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root when the series 
are actually stationary. For this reason, we compare these test results with those from the 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992) test that posits a null of no unit root. Reliability 
is greatly enhanced if all three unit root tests give results that are in agreement. The results 
reported in the first panel of table 3 shows that this is in fact the case, indicating that the TFP 
series is stationary with a deterministic trend.   
Unit Root Tests with Structural Breaks   
The result of the qLL test indicates the presence of one or more structural breaks in the time 
series, and we test if the absence of a stochastic trend and a unit root are influenced by possible 
structural breaks. We employ two types of unit root tests that allow for possible structural breaks, 
the Clemente, Montanes and Reyes (CMR) (1998) test and the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test. 
While both tests maintain a unit root under the null hypothesis, the former has as the alternative 
hypothesis stationarity when only a shift in the intercept is present and the latter when there is 
trend stationarity with trend breaks.   
The CMR test allows us to determine if the time series is stationary with possibly two 
intercept shifts, but it does not allow for a trend break. There are two models under the CMR 
test. One is an ‘additive outliers’ (AO) model, which can capture a sudden change in the series. 
The other is an ‘innovational outliers’ (IO) model which captures a more gradual shift in the 
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intercept of the series. Table 3 shows the test results for both the AO and IO models, which 
indicate non-stationarity with either one intercept shift or a double-intercept shift.  
The Zivot and Andrews test for a unit root has as the alternative hypothesis that the time 
series is trend stationary with a one-time break in the level or trend or both occurring at an 
unknown point in time. They choose the breakpoint that minimizes the one-sided t-statistic under 
the null of a unit root (i.e.,   = 1 in equation (2) below):         
(2)     =  +  +                                         
The trend-stationary alternative hypotheses include: 
(3)     =  +  + (−) +       
(4)    =  +  + (−)∗ +        
(5)    =  +  + (−) + (−)∗ +     
where  = 1 if  >    and zero otherwise and   is the breakpoint, and ∗ =  −   if  
 >   and zero otherwise. Equation (3) allows for an intercept shift, while equation (4) allows 
for a trend break. Equation (5) combines both an intercept shift and a trend break. We note, 
however, that the Zivot and Zndrews tests only allow for one breakdate. The results presented in 
table 3 indicate that the TFP series is stationary when an intercept shift or both an intercept shift 
and a trend break are included. The Zivot and Andrews tests place an optimal breakpoint at 1985.  
 The evidence suggests that the TFP series is trend stationary with structural breaks. The 
CMR test indicates the presence of a unit root. But this test does not include a possible break in 
trend under the alternative hypothesis. As noted by Perron’s (1989), unit root tests that ignore 
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possible structural breaks will be biased in favor of failing to reject the null of a unit root. We conclude 
that it is necessary to include a deterministic trend in a regression model with TFP as the 
dependent variable to ensure stationarity, but additional tests are required to fully characterize 
the nature and timing of the structural change.  
Estimating Structural Breaks with Unknown Timing 
The next step we take is to estimate the breakdate or breakdates that best depict the trend rate of 
growth of TFP over the study period. Hansen (2001) suggests that one candidate for a breakdate 
is the date that yields the largest test statistic in a sequence of Chow tests. The problem with this 
approach is that the Chow test is designed for a break that separates the entire sample into two 
subperiods; only one breakdate is considered. What if the breakdates are different for an 
intercept shift and a break in trend? Although Bia and Perron (1998) develop a test for multiple 
structural changes, their test is appropriate only when there are no trending regressors. Similarly, 
the CMR test does not test for a break in trend. We could, however, use the Zivot and Andrews 
test results as a first step in determining optimal breakdates.8 For this purpose, we rewrite 
equation (1) to allow for multiple breaks in intercept and trend as follows: 
(6)   ln  =  +  ! + 
 +     
(7)   ln  =  +  ! + 
 + 
 " +   
where  ! = 1 if  > #and zero otherwise,  " = 1 if  > #	and zero otherwise, and 
#$, % = 1,2, represent possibly different breakdates. We note that additional breakdates may be 
necessary to completely characterize the breaking activity. We further note that breaks in trend 
and intercept need not be contemporaneous.  
                                                          
8
 Lee and Strazicich (2001) evaluate the interaction between this unit root test and optimal breakdates. 
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In estimating the parameters in equations (6) and (7)—including the breakdates and their 
coefficients—we use least squares. The least squares breakdate is that which minimizes the full 
sample sum of squared errors (equivalently, minimizes the residual variance). We conduct qLL 
tests on sub-sample periods before and after sequential breakdate candidates until no further 
breakdates are detected.  
Given the results of the qLL test (see table 2, rows 2 through 5) and the Zivot and 
Andews test (see table 3), we estimate equation (6) using 1985 as the intercept breakdate. The 
results are presented in table 4. The qLL test based on this estimation shows that there is at least 
one additional structural break. Next, we estimate equation (7) with both an intercept shift and a 
trend break in 1985. The results reported in table 4 show that the break in 1985 shifted the 
intercept to a higher level, but the trend break in 1985 was not significant. This suggests that 
there may exist different breakdates for intercept and trend. Accordingly, we estimate equation 
(7) with an intercept shift in 1985 and a trend break in different years sequentially. We plot the 
residual variances as a function of individual trend breakdates in figure 1. The sum of squared 
errors will have a minimum near the true breakdate. According to figure 1, we can find two well 
defined minima—a global minimum in 1974 and the second minimum in 1978 for the trend 
breakdates. We then conduct the qLL test using 1985 as the intercept shift and 1974 as the trend 
break. The results reported in table 4 indicate that there are no further breaks.  
Having independently verified the possibility of breaks in intercept and trend, we present 
three sets of results in tables 4 and 5. These include a trend break in 1985, both an intercept shift 
and a trend break in 1985, and a trend break in 1974 and an intercept shift in 1985. The intercept 
shift is positive and statistically significant, indicating a shift to a higher level of productivity in 
1985. The trend break in 1985 is positive and significant when we allow only a trend break, but 
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the trend break becomes negative in both 1974 and 1985 when an intercept shift is included. The 
results are statistically significant only when the breakdate is 1974. These results imply a 
permanent slowdown in the rate of productivity growth beginning in 1974. Prior to 1974, TFP 
grew at an annual rate of 1.71 percent, but this rate of growth slowed to 1.56 percent after 1974. 
Moreover, this slower rate of productivity growth persisted after the intercept shift in 1985, 
implying a slower rate of growth but from a higher absolute level of productivity. This outcome 
is depicted graphically in figure 2. 
Breakdates and Exogenous Shocks 
Those statistical tests that allow the appropriate characterization of trends in TFP also identify 
structural breaks in the time series. This section concludes with a discussion of shocks that were 
exogenous to the sector that provide anecdotal evidence in support of the choice of breakdates, as 
well as suggesting possible directions for future research. The break in trend in 1974 was 
coincident with the 1973 oil embargo that resulted in a rapid and unexpected rise in energy 
prices. It seems plausible to argue that the rise in energy prices also accelerated the rate of 
obsolescence of the stock of physical capital in agriculture.9 But since conventional measures of 
capital stock do not capture changes in the rate of obsolescence, conventional measures of 
productivity growth will fail to identify this effect. Instead, it will be suppressed into a residual 
estimate of productivity change. 
 If there is a significant link between energy prices and obsolescence, it should be 
revealed in the price of used assets. Indeed, if rising energy costs did render older, energy-
inefficient capital obsolete, the price of used assets would decline.10 An examination of the prices 
                                                          
9
 Empirical support for the obsolescence hypothesis can be found in Ball et al. (2001).  
10
 Note that a decline in an asset’s value is the definition of obsolescence. 
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of used assets before and after the energy price shock should reveal the sign and magnitude of 
the obsolescence effect. This is a subject for future research.  
The intercept shift in 1985 was more likely linked to macroeconomic developments and 
to changes in farm policy.11 During the 1970s, monetary policy largely accommodated inflation, 
ostensibly to erode real wages and lower unemployment. But this changed in the early 1980s. 
The adoption of a restrictive monetary policy by the Federal Reserve pushed up interest rates 
sharply. The dollar appreciated on foreign exchange markets, and world export prices started to 
fall. This had the short-run effect of undermining United States competitiveness.    
Agriculture’s competitive position was further eroded when the Agricultural and Food 
Act of 1981 was enacted. In the 1981 Act, the tie between target prices and inflation was broken, 
and specific levels of price support were mandated for each year between 1982 and 1985. More 
important, the levels of support were determined based on the expectation of continued high 
rates of inflation. As a result, prices in the United States remained at or near record levels long 
after the momentum of inflation was broken.   
Equally significant was the accumulation of stocks in the Farmer Owned Reserve (FOR) 
program. The FOR provided storage subsidies to farmers to store grain under loan for 3 to 5 
years.12 Producers agreed not to market grain from the Reserve for this period unless the price 
reached a specified release level. The longer duration of the FOR program, combined with high 
release prices needed for grain to exit the Reserve, effectively isolated a large amount of grain 
from the market. By 1982, corn held in the FOR rose to almost 2 billion bushels, or 25 percent of 
annual use. Wheat in the Reserve exceeded 1 billion bushels or some 40 percent of annual use. 
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 Costello (1993) found that a substantial fraction of annual changes in productivity can be attributed to 
macroeconomic factors that are common across industries.  
12
 The marketing loan was a 9-month program.   
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Thus high price supports along with the isolation of FOR stocks from the market resulted in a 
significant policy effect on prices and production. 
Changes to the price support program in the 1985 farm legislation reduced the impact of 
that program on price determination. These changes were part of a more market oriented farm 
policy. Significant were changes in the level of support; loan rates were adjusted downward. The 
volume of grain permitted into the FOR was sharply curtailed. And a new policy instrument, 
generic certificates, made grain in the Reserve available to the market by allowing access to that 
grain before its FOR contract expired.13 As a consequence, since 1985, commodity prices have 
largely been based on market supply and demand with reduced influence of government price 
support and commodity stockholding programs. 
5. Concluding Remarks  
A number of recent studies have concluded that productivity growth in the U.S agricultural 
sector has slowed (Alston and Pardey, 2009; James et al., 2009). In arriving at this conclusion, 
the authors partitioned the time series into two sub-periods and compared the resulting mean 
rates of growth. A more formal approach, attributed to Chow (1960), involves estimating the 
regression parameters for each sub-period and testing the equality of the two sets of parameters 
using an F-test. An important limitation of both approaches is that the breakdate must be known 
a priori. The researcher must either pick an arbitrary candidate breakdate or pick a breakdate 
based on some known feature of the data. As Hansen (2001) points out, the test results can be 
‘uninformative’ because they can miss the true breakdate, or can be ‘misleading’ because the 
                                                          
13
  Generic certificates were dollar denominated negotiable certificates that were issued by the USDA in lieu of cash 
payments to program participants. Generic certificates did not specify any particular commodity. They could be used 
to acquire stocks held as collateral on government loans (marketing loans or FOR loans) or stocks owned by the 
Commodity Credit Corporation.   
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breakdate is endogenous and the test can indicate a break when none in fact exists. We test for a 
productivity slowdown using techniques that allow for unknown structural breaks jointly with a 
possible unit root that can have either or both stochastic and deterministic components.  
Our empirical results show that two types of structural change have occurred over the 
postwar period, and both have influenced the long term path of productivity growth in the 
agricultural sector. First, we observe a break in trend in 1974. Prior to 1974, productivity grew at 
an average annual rate of 1.71 percent, but this rate of growth slowed to 1.56 percent per year 
after 1974. The break in trend was coincident with the 1973 oil embargo that resulted in a rapid 
and unexpected rise in energy prices. We find it plausible that the rise in energy prices 
accelerated the rate of obsolescence of the stock of physical capital in agriculture. But since the 
measure of capital stock does not capture changes in the rate of obsolescence, conventional 
measures of productivity growth will fail to identify this effect. Instead, it will be suppressed into 
a residual estimate of productivity change.   
 A different type of structural change occurred in 1985. Following a significant 
liberalization of farm policy in that year, we observed a one-time upward shift in the level of 
productivity. The slower rate of productivity growth persisted after the intercept shift in 1985, 
implying a slower rate of growth but from a higher absolute level of productivity. 
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Table 1. Average annual rates of growth (percent), 1948-2009 (2005=1) 
Period Total output Total farm input Capital Labor Intermediate inputs      TFP 
      
  
All 
Farm 
origin Energy 
Agricultural 
chemicals 
Purchased 
services   
1948-2009 1.63 0.11 -0.21 -2.51 1.43 1.15 0.85 2.54 1.15 1.52 
1948-1953 1.18 1.34 1.75 -3.34 3.72 2.23 4.61 2.87 2.40 -0.16 
1953-1957 0.96 0.28 -0.10 -4.58 2.86 3.73 0.15 1.35 1.88 0.68 
1957-1960 4.03 0.50 -0.43 -3.74 2.95 2.58 0.06 5.95 5.42 3.53 
1960-1966 1.21 0.05 0.05 -3.75 1.72 1.73 1.65 5.54 -0.67 1.16 
1966-1969 2.24 -0.08 0.34 -2.78 0.88 2.13 0.43 -2.99 -0.75 2.32 
1969-1973 2.65 0.46 -0.44 -1.84 2.02 1.70 -0.42 8.22 0.40 2.19 
1973-1979 2.26 1.64 1.04 -1.06 2.76 1.83 4.09 3.29 4.84 0.62 
1979-1981 1.53 -1.85 0.39 -1.39 -3.05 -2.68 -3.35 2.54 -7.50 3.39 
1981-1990 0.96 -1.22 -2.16 -2.79 -0.13 -0.19 -1.59 -0.75 0.39 2.19 
1990-2000 1.84 0.31 -0.75 -1.63 1.64 1.20 0.96 2.85 2.38 1.53 
2000-2007 0.77 0.14 -0.16 -1.56 0.88 0.48 -0.74 1.55 1.18 0.63 
2007-2009 1.88 -1.80 0.88 -3.69 -2.41 -3.27 5.24 1.32 -5.19 3.68 
Note: The subperiods are measured from cyclical peak to peak in aggregate economic activity as defined by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (see http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). 
 21
 
Table 2 Elliott-Muller qLL test results 
Breaks   qLL statistics1   
without break -17.41 ** 
with intercept break at 1985 only -16.32 ** 
with trend break at 1985 only -22.11 *** 
with intercept and trend break at 1985  -13.44 * 
with intercept break at 1985 and trend break at 1974 -9.05 
      
Note 1: The null hypothesis is
 
coefficients are fixed over the sample period 
Note 2: '*' indicates significant at 5% level; '**' indicates significant at 10% level, '***' indicates significant at 1% level. 
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Table 3 Results of unit root tests 
Tests1 Test result 
    
Unit root test without break 
  
ADF unit root test 
    without trend nonstationary 
    with trend stationary 
  
KPSS unit root test  
    without trend nonstationary 
    with trend stationary 
  
PP unit root test 
    without trend nonstationary 
    with trend stationary 
  
  
Unit root test with break 
  
CMR unit root test  
    AO1--with one intercept shift nonstationary 
    AO2--with double intercept shifts  nonstationary 
    IO1--with one intercept shift  nonstationary 
    IO2--with double intercept shifts  nonstationary 
  
Z-Andrews unit root test with trend 
    both trend and intercept shift with break at 1985 stationary 
    
Note1: the significance level used for these tests is 5%.  
 23
Table 4. Results of OLS regression model estimation 
  Model A1      Model B2      Model C3     
Models coefficients t statistics4   coefficients t statistics   coefficients t statistics   
Intercept 3.6528 270.00 *** 3.6461 325.62 *** 3.6317 307.50 *** 
t 0.0153 25.63 *** 0.0156 30.88 *** 0.0171 22.30 *** 
d1985 0.0920 2.02 ** 0.0718 4.68 *** 
tD1985 0.0013 3.11 *** -0.0007 -0.68 
tD1974 -0.0015 -2.56 ** 
      
D-W statistics 2.1135     2.2666     1.9846     
Pr < D-W 0.5732 0.7437 0.3224 
Pr > D-W 0.4268 0.2563 0.6776 
R2 0.9877 0.9897 0.9965 
adjusted R2 0.9873     0.9892     0.9917     
Note 1: Model with trend break at 1985 only 
Note 2: Model with intercept shift and trend break at 
1985 
Note 3: Model with intercept shift at 1985 and trend break at 1974 
  Note 4: '***' indicates significant at 1% level; '**' indicates significant at 5% level; "*' indicates significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5: Test Results of Productivity Slowdown 
  Annual productivity growth rate (%) Difference   
Models with alternative breaks First period (A) Second period (B) (B-A)   
A. With trend break at 1985 only 1.54 1.67 0.12 *** 
B. With both intercept and trend breaks at 1985 1.57 1.50 -0.07 
C. With intercept break at 1985 and trend break at 1974 1.71 1.57 -0.14 ** 
          
 
Note 1: '***' indicates significant at 1% level; '**' indicates significant at 5% level 
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Figure 1. Least Squares Breakpoint Estimation  
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